



COUNTRY COORDINATING MECHANISM MODEL CCM OVERSIGHT PRACTICES

Following the success of grant applications, Country Coordinating Mechanisms (CCMs) are expected to turn their attention to oversight, ensuring that resources are used efficiently and work to deliver agreed objectives. To examine progress with CCM oversight, case studies were conducted in the **Andean and Caribbean regions, Bulgaria, Ethiopia, Kenya, Peru, Tajikistan, Tanzania, and Zambia.**

Despite the fact that oversight plans are a requirement for Global Fund financing, many, if not most, CCMs and Regional Coordinating Mechanisms (RCMs), were unprepared for their responsibilities. CCMs were reported to have been so focused on developing grants that oversight, and all that it entails, came as an afterthought. Some CCMs were said to have had problems conceptualizing the role. A common misunderstanding was that the Principal Recipient (PR) was thought to be responsible for oversight. In

Tajikistan, however, the CCM initially thought it should influence disbursements – a task normally administered by PRs, with the exception of instances where changes in objectives are anticipated. In part, some confusion was attributed to their own governance documents having overlooked the subject of oversight (**Kenya, Tajikistan, and Zambia**).

Other difficulties lay in imbalances of power and conflict of interest. The fact that **Kenya's** CCM was not a legal entity was considered problematic.¹ Furthermore, in **Kenya** and elsewhere, the PRs were considered the dominant force compared to the CCM. PRs not only controlled financial resources, but had resources and insights that the CCM lacked. Wherever the CCM Secretariat was hosted by a PR or sub-recipient – as is often the case – there were perceptions that objectivity in oversight was compromised. And finally, many members were engaged in full-time activities elsewhere, making it difficult

for them to commit a sufficient amount of time to the CCM.

The single major obstacle to progress was, however, the support of a well-resourced CCM Secretariat. CCM members' ability to focus on oversight initially suffered from dysfunctional meetings, the need to digest voluminous documentation and communication problems with PRs. With time, and the generous support of donors and development partners, all CCMs covered by the case studies had established secretariats. Once secretariats subsumed administrative functions, it became possible for CCM members to address oversight responsibilities. In **Zambia**, poor grant performance and the threat of discontinued financing was also said to have galvanized progress in this field.

CCMs have developed different arrangements to gain insights into program performance. Most have institutionalized monthly (**Peru**) or quarterly meetings (**Bulgaria, Ethiopia**) in which the PRs present

¹ Most CCMs are not legal entities though, increasingly, some are choosing to become legally recognized. This is an evolving situation and depends greatly on the legal system used and the culture of litigation practiced.

a progress report covering the preceding period as well as future plans. This, coupled with moves to include non-CCM members and the Local Fund Agent (LFA) in the same meetings, as well as reports from sub-recipients, was stated to broaden insights, help with identifying and resolving problems, and contribute to increased transparency. **Ethiopia** had taken the concept of inclusive CCM meetings furthest – they had instituted an open-door policy.

With the exception of the **Bulgarian** CCM, which preferred ad hoc arrangements, all other CCMs had constituted standing committees to oversee finances and programs. Technical teams had been con-

stituted to review progress with tuberculosis (TB), malaria, and HIV/AIDS grant components using experts from within and outside CCMs. **Ethiopia's** CCM had a particularly systematic, hands-on approach using routine field observations following defined terms of reference. Regional CCMs for the Caribbean and Andean regions largely relied on PR reports for information, although both had relatively recently convened technical groups to assist with reviewing progress with implementation. Civil society involvement with oversight was said to be increasing. For instance, CCMs in **Peru** and **Tajikistan** routinely consulted with networks, partner forums, and various alliances of

nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) for matters of policy and to gain program insights. New tools were also being developed to assist with tracking performance and sharing information. **Peru's** PR had developed an automated system to track the finances of sub-recipients. This system satisfied the LFA and simplified the oversight function of the CCM. **Tanzania** was experimenting with a visual management tool which uses a color-coded system to indicate progress with targets.

Wider replication of accomplishments was called for to accelerate progress with oversight. As CCMs take on more grants, oversight challenges are anticipated to increase.

RECOMMENDATIONS

CCM manuals articulating roles and responsibilities for oversight

Strengthened CCM Secretariats assume administrative and (limited) technical functions including meeting coordination, timely information dissemination, synthesizing reports and coordinating logistics for program reviews

Regular progress updates by PRs at CCM meetings in the presence of LFA and other (independent) observers

Site visits (with clear terms of reference) by CCM members and non-CCM members

Civil society networks and other partner fora contribute to program reviews

www.theglobalfund.org